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EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH OF TERMINAL CONTROL AREA OPER-
ATIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY CONDITIONS 
The experimental research of terminal control area operations under uncertainty con-
ditions is considered. The Identification and assessment of threat factors in air traffic 
controller operation, identification of the point of controllers’ extreme operational 
conditions appearance and recommendations on associated errors capture and miti-
gation and improvement of airspace structure on the strategic planning phase are 
considered. 
Introduction 
The workload of a controller must be accurately assessed to permit optimum 
efficiency. If it is too high for too long, they may be overstretched. That is why it is 
necessary to define, when exactly the extreme conditions for controller operations start 
to appear and to identify possible consequences of this as well as to provide counter-
measures to avoid them with the aim of supporting effective safety provision. 
Considering specificity and complexity of process of ATCO activity in termi-
nal control area (TMA), identification and analysis of threat and risk factors are ex-
tremely important task of Safety Management System with the purpose to maintain 
correspondent safety level. In this term EUROCONTROL has developed Air Naviga-
tion system Safety Assessment Methodology, ANS SAM) that includes threat and risk 
assessment. Methodology provides implementation of necessary strategies for mainte-
nance of acceptable safety level, constant monitoring, regular assessment of achieved 
safety level and making continuous improvement to the overall level of safety [1-4]. 
Identification (assessment) of threat factors in ATCO operation under uncer-
tainty conditions 
On the basis of existing risk assessment principles, specific method of assess-
ment concrete identified threats examples was developed that is applicable for opera-
tion of ATCO of TMA. The first step of conducted investigation was identification of 
main threats during operation of controller in terminal area. The next stage was making 
of creating questionnaires and making survey among group of air traffic controllers of 
correspondent workplace. Respondents should arrange the values of probability (from 
1 to 100%) and severity (from 1 to 10) that treat will occur (Table 1). 
The next step of investigation was creation of matrix of threats and risks that 
were characterized in term of severity and probability and definition of temporary, 
acceptable and non-acceptable regions. Assessed threats were put into matrix and it 
was defined regions what definite threat was belong to. For threats that belong to non-
acceptable region the specific strategies of control and mitigation are applied. Applica-
tion of such a strategies transit threats to the temporary area and then specific methods 
are used to transit them to acceptable region. In case if strategies are not applicable 
then activity that revoke definite threat should be terminated. 
Table 1 






1 Variable flight profile 85 3 
2 Insufficient horizontal size of TMA for maneuvering (in 
case of high intensity) 
70 4 
3 Adverse meteorological conditions 90 8 
4 Go-around aircraft 40 4 
5 Aircraft that perform flight in holding area 35 2 
6 Errors of adjacent ATCO 20 4 
7 Errors of ATCO passing of duty 25 4 
8 Technical maintenance of ground equipment 80 5 
9 Failures of airborne equipment 35 6 
10 Psycho physiological state of ATCO 25 5 
11 Psycho physiological state of pilot 25 6 
12 Professional training of ATCO  23 7 
13 Professional training of pilot 23 7 
14 ATC in contested airspace (ATC without co-ordination) 65 8 
15 Similar callsigns 35 4 
16 Excessive (insufficient) workload of ATCO 60 6 
Identification of the point of controllers’ extreme operational conditions ap-
pearance and recommendations on associated errors capture and mitigation 
Defining the factors influencing workload increase 
During the 1st step of the research there were firstly analysed literature re-
sources and defined the factors that may contribute significantly to the increase of 
workload under uncertainty conditions. After that the participants were provided with a 
list of the most widespread factors that can cause extreme operational conditions dur-
ing the shift. After analysing the results and calculating all necessary statistical charac-
teristics there was obtained the ranking of the factors contributing to workload increase 
under uncertainty conditions. The first three of them were: high density of flights, bad 
meteorological conditions, bad cooperation with other controllers in a shift. 
High density of flights was considered the most important and highly influenc-
ing factor on the air traffic controller workload by almost all the experts. That is why 
this factor will be further investigated by us in the second step of the research. 
Investigation of the point of extreme operational conditions appearance 
During the 2nd step of the research the participants were provided with the in-
formation regarding the workload categories as well as the map and some data regard-
ing a special sector for which they had to perform the task. The task was to identify the 
number of ACFT for this exact sector at which the controller experiences each of the 
workload categories. 
The obtained results were represented on the figure 1, which shows how work-
load increases and how its category changes according to controllers’ opinions with 
increase of ACFT being simultaneously under control (under uncertainty conditions). 
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Fig. 1. Experimental correlation of workload from ACFT number under control 
 
Identification of errors that may appear in extreme operational conditions 
During this step there were identified errors that are most probable to occur in 
extreme operational conditions. The participants had to tick off those errors from the 
list, sorted to the categories, which, on their opinion, could be caused by IV category of 
workload described in previous step. 
There was also found out that the most probable errors to occur in extreme op-
erational conditions are as follows: missed calls, making incorrect inputs to the auto-
mated system, rushed handover, wrong clearance, altitude or heading communicated, 
misinterpretations of requests. These and other errors that have a possibility of occur-
rence more than 50% were considered in the 4th part of the research and were provided 
with the countermeasures for their avoidance and mitigating. 
Providing recommendations and countermeasures 
After providing the investigation there were offer certain countermeasures that 
can help to avoid and/or neutralize the exact errors that are most probable to occur 
under extreme operational conditions as this state is the most dangerous and errors 
mitigating during it has the greatest influence on safety provision. For this purpose 
there were analyzed known resources and composed a list of countermeasures that can 
be used to avoid errors mentioned in step 3 of the research. The list included such 
countermeasures as enhancing the team climate, improving planning and execution 
procedures, providing necessary reviews and modifications and organizing trainings 
for the personnel. 
Improvement of airspace structure on the strategic planning phase 
The newest route structure that is being currently implemented in the major 
European TMAs is Point Merge System (PMS). To define what advantages PMS 
brings to the Kyiv TMA the modelling of PMS arrivals was performed with the help of 
NEST modelling tool provided by EUROCONTROL. 
After trajectories simulation was performed it is possible to analyse whether 
the route structure is efficient using traffic indicators. With the help of functions em-
bedded in NEST the route length, airspace load and workload of current Kyiv TMA 
route structure and PMS were performed under uncertainty conditions. The results 
showed the decrease in route length by 3209.6 nm (1.28%). The comparison of work-
load is shown in Fig. 2. Moreover, capacity evaluation was performed using CAPAN 
methodology with the help of MatLab. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Comparison of ATCO workload under current arrivals (blue) and PMS (red) 
Conclusions 
As the conclusion, the results of the experiment can be used in educational 
purposes and further researches on the topic (TMA operations under uncertainty condi-
tions) as well as to utilize the developed countermeasures on practice for experienced 
air traffic controllers on the daily bases. This could help to enhance personnel 
knowledge regarding safety, decrease operational uncertainty and support safety provi-
sion by mitigating the errors that may occur, that is to encourage the first and main 
purpose of the aviation. 
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